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THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY: A
TRANSITION TO THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAWMAKING?
Graeme Dinwoodiet
In recent years, the process of international copyright lawmaking
has become quite different from that which gave birth to the Berne
Convention.' If asked to identify the moment at which the
international process changed, most commentators might highlight
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
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Rights (TRIPS)2 as an era-defining event. 3 And, to be sure, TRIPS did
radically change the institutional structure of the international
intellectual property system as well as some of the assumptions
underlying the system.4 But I would like to suggest that the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (or WCT)5 also represented a watershed moment in
international copyright law. Critical analysis of the debates leading up
to and during the conclusion of that treaty in 1996 highlights a
number of the challenges that we need to confront in shaping the
future of international copyright lawmaking.
The WIPO Copyright Treaty radically changed the international
copyright lawmaking environment for two reasons. First, it was in the
1996 Diplomatic Conference that one begins to see the most
widespread explicit discussion of the concept of "balance" being
integral to international instruments. Indeed, this led to recognition of
that concept in the preamble to the treaty. Of course, the importance
of balance in the international copyright system had been discussed
before 1996. For example, the Stockholm revision of the Berne
Convention in 1967 clearly sought to reflect a new balance that more
explicitly recognized the concerns of developing countries about
access to copyrighted works.6 But the rhetoric or language of balance
came to the forefront in 1996 with the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and
this rhetoric increasingly frames the current debate.
Second, the WCT was a watershed moment for international
copyright law in that the process that led up to the conclusion of the
two Internet treaties (both the WCT and the WIPO Performances and
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. See generally DANIEL GERvAIS,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2008).
3 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Institutions ofInternational Intellectual Property Law:
New Actors, New Institutions, and New Sources, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 98TH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 213,213 (2004).
4 In many respects, the TRIPS Agreement adhered to the core conceptual approach of the
Berne Convention. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International
Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993, 995 (2002).
5 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94, available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/pdf/94dc.pdf.
6 See Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works
in Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 142, 148 (Maskus
and Reichman eds. 2005); 2 RICKETSON AND GINSBURG, supra note 1, at §§ 14.16-33.
Likewise, article 7 of the TRIPs Agreement clearly embodies a concern for balance, albeit
in quite abstract terms. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 7 ("The protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.").
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Phonograms Treaty) and the conduct of the diplomatic conference at
which they were considered were quite different in several respects
from that which had been seen heretofore. In particular, on some of
the issues addressed in the treaty, the contracting states relied much
less extensively on prior national experimentation than had been the
norm in prior copyright agreements. For example, on the crucial issue
of prohibiting the circumvention of technological protection measures
(TPMs), contracting states sought an international solution at a very
early stage in the development of norms. Moreover, the 1996
Diplomatic Conference was populated by a wide range of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in numbers never before
seen at international copyright events. And (perhaps because of these
first two changes in process), the debates that took place nationally
and internationally were substantially assimilated. These features of
the process that led to the WCT remain with us today.
This brief essay addresses both the concept of balance and these
changes to the lawmaking process. On the question of balance, I
suggest that balance is a much more complicated concept than we
assume. Even in the domestic environment, the phrase is used
somewhat too glibly. But in the international context, it becomes even
more complex.7 In particular, we need to take into account the
multidimensional nature of balance (or what I call the various vectors
of balance) before we try to insert internal substantive balance
directly into treaty instruments. This is true whether we are talking
about new authors' rights or the development of users' rights.
I am also concerned by some aspects of the changes that occurred
to the lawmaking process in 1996. In particular, there is often a
failure to appreciate fully the difference between national lawmaking
and international lawmaking. To be sure, in a dynamic, integrated
lawmaking process, one is a constituent part of the other; that is,
national lawmaking contributes to international lawmaking and vice
versa.8 But these processes involve different institutions with different
democratic and political structures; those urging further reform of
international copyright law need to be aware of these differences.
7 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of International
Copyright Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160 J. INST. AND THEORETICAL ECON. 161
(2004).
8 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Essay, The Integration of International and Domestic
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307 (2000).
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I. BALANCE
For quite some time, few discussions of domestic copyright law
have failed to address the need to preserve a balance (or, commonly, a
"delicate" balance) between incentivizing creation by authors and
ensuring that others can access and use works thus created. 9 But it is
increasingly common to hear participants in international copyright
lawmaking also talk about balance. Indeed, of late, it appears that
neither the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) nor the
World Trade Organization (the WTO) is allowed to issue a press
release that doesn't mention the word "balance."
The term "balance" is found in the language of the preamble to the
WIPO Copyright Treaty,10  which was the most explicit
acknowledgment of the concept on its own terms then found in a
global copyright agreement. The language in question was first
advanced by India during the discussions in Geneva, and in the final
text the preamble makes reference to a "balance between the rights of
authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research,
and access to information. '' i"
This reference has been celebrated by many commentators as a
change in the tone of international copyright law.12 And it certainly
reads quite differently from the language in the documents that had
been produced early in the process leading up the WIPO Copyright
Treaty. By way of comparison, consider a 1988 preparatory document
that WIPO produced for consideration by a forum whose
deliberations about norm-setting later fed into the work of the
Committee of Experts that (eventually) led to the 1996 treaty:
The objective [of the proposals for the setting of norms in the
field of intellectual property law] is to make the protection of
9 See Dinwoodie, supra note 7, at 164-66 (discussing difficulties of balance in the
domestic context). Although there are other metrics according to which we could develop
copyright law, such as economic efficiency, social utility or ends-means proportionality, few are
as rhetorically pervasive as "balance."
10 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 5, preamble.
11 See id.
12 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369,
375 (1997); Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 442 (1997); David Nimmer, A Tale of Two
Treaties, 22 CoLuM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 1, 1 (1997) ("It was a far better copyright treaty than
the world had ever attempted before."). In light of the national legislation implementing the
WCT, see infra note 32, the language may seem less significant. Indeed, as Professor David
Vaver commented in his contribution to this symposium, the "balancing" exercise contemplated
in the preamble may be skewed in advance through the characterization of copyright owner
"rights" and public "interests." See David Vaver, Copyright and the Internet: From Owner
Rights and User Duties to User Rights and Owner Duties?, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 731, 736
(2007); id. at 747 (suggesting a "way out of this linguistic hole").
[Vol. 57:4
WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY
intellectual property rights more effective throughout the
world. "More effective" means that the norms and standards
of protection are raised, where necessary, to the required
level, and that enforcement of intellectual property rights will
be easier and the sanctions for infringement stricter. This
objective may be achieved by creating new treaty obligations
or by persuasion.13
This is very different language from what ended up in the
preamble to the 1996 treaty. In fact, during the debates at the
Diplomatic Conference, the concept of "balance" was ubiquitous.
According to notes taken contemporaneously, Bruce Lehman, the
head of the U.S. delegation, "led off the discussion with a short and
highly generalized statement of support for the treaties, recognizing
the importance of 'meaningful and balanced protection."'' 1 4 The same
sentiment was expressed in interventions by the European
Communities and a number of Asian countries. Likewise, most
delegates from "developing countries in Africa and the Middle East
emphasized the need for a balance among right holders, affected
industries and public interests."'
' 5
Implicit in this celebration of balance is the fact that international
copyright treaties historically had not made explicit reference to
substantive balance. The classical international copyright system (in
the sense of the network of treaties, at the center of which stood the
Berne Convention) did not of itself try to achieve substantive balance.
But this was not because the classical system was pursuing
imbalance. Rather, it was because the international system was trying
both to do more and to do less with respect to balance than the
domestic copyright system.
It was doing less in the sense that the international system did not
articulate positive copyright law. Instead, it established parameters
within which national political processes created the substantive
balance appropriate to the circumstances of each different domestic
order. By the same token, the international system was doing more
than the domestic system with respect to balance because in addition
13 See MIHALY FiCSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET 11 (2002) (quoting
the relevant document, and describing activity around this time as an "important step" toward
the treaty making that culminated in the adoption of the 1996 treaties).
14 Day-by-day reports on the Diplomatic Conference were prepared by Seth Greenstein
for the Home Recording Rights Coalition, which could be found at <http://www.hrrc.org/
newswipo.html> until they were taken down from this website some time after the conference
ended. Copies of these reports [hereinafter Greenstein Report] are on file with the author. See
Greenstein Report, December 5, 1996.
15 See id.
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to considering (to some extent) the appropriate outside levels of
protection to be mandated internationally, it also sought to reflect an
additional balance. That is, the balance between national autonomy on
the one hand and universal standards on the other. 16
One might argue that the restrictions that the international
copyright system imposed on national lawmakers were inherently
imbalanced in that the international copyright system on the whole
simply articulated minimum levels of protection. It established very
few ceilings on protection. 17 This feature of the system to some extent
simply reflected the context in which the classical system arose. The
Berne Convention was concluded at a time where countries were
trying to create basic protection against rampant piracy (as well as to
negotiate protection for foreigners). As a result, Berne Convention
contained very little by way of explicit commitment, in those terms at
least, to balance.
But there was plenty of room for balance. Because the mandated
standards in the Berne Convention were relatively unobtrusive,
nations retained a great deal of flexibility to achieve in their own
domestic law the substantive balance they wanted. There was no real
enforcement mechanism for contracting states that sailed too close to
the wind, as the U.S. attitude to compliance with article 6bis
highlighted. 18 And the international system was primarily a codifying
device. It tended to consolidate norms on which most of the world
already agreed, based upon positive experience in national law. 19 As a
result, balance could be achieved on the ground, not through a
substantive balance mandated in the international treaty but through
conceiving of the "international copyright system" in broader terms
that encompassed regard for national law.
Fast forward to 1994 and the TRIPS Agreement; this was the
moment when many commentators think the international intellectual
property system changed. At this time, the WIPO Copyright Treaty
was still in the early stages of debate (though its precursors go back
some years earlier). The TRIPS agreement, like the Berne
16 See Dinwoodie, supra note 7, at 165 ("Discussion of international copyright policy thus
extends ... to [include] whether certain norms should be allowed to evolve differently at the
national level in lieu of articulating an international rule.").
17 The classical system imposed limits largely by way of floors below which national
levels of protection could not fall. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why
National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 491 (2000). Ceilings
were rarer, though some arguably do exist. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 191,220-21 (Guibault & Hugenholtz eds. 2006).
IS See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms
in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OH1O ST. L. J. 733, 740-41 (2001).
19 See Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 492-94
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Convention, contains important flexibilities and limitations.2 °
Obviously those flexibilities have drastically been reduced by more
effective enforcement mechanisms and, especially in the patent area,
some greater detail on substantive obligations. 21  But the basic
conceptual framework was kept in place. Substantive balance in
applicable intellectual property law was to be achieved in large part
by relying on national political processes.
In fact, if one is to find balance embedded in the TRIPs Agreement
itself, it can only be found by situating the Agreement in its broader
context of the WTO Agreements. In return for accepting restrictions
on their national autonomy to maintain unduly low levels of
intellectual property protection, developing countries secured benefits
in terms of market access.22 That is, the WTO Agreements contained
a balance not simply between right holders' interests, on the one
hand, and user groups' interests on the other, or between national
autonomy and universality. Rather, they also embodied a balance
between intellectual property obligations and nonintellectual property
commitments. There was, in effect, another vector of balance
introduced into the calculus underlying TRIPS.
The concept of balance explicitly introduced in the preamble to the
WIPO Copyright Treaty (and its significance) has to be understood in
this broader context. Indeed, one could complexify the vectors of
balance further. The balance that policymakers pursue might be
achieved not only internally through copyright law alone, but also
through the relationship between copyright, on the one hand, and
contract law and competition law, on the other.23 Or, one could argue
that real balance is achieved through a combination of legal rules and
enforcement or compliance, a dynamic which is obviously affected by
20 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431 (2004).
21 One of the important innovations of the TRIPs Agreement was the incorporation of the
substantive TRIPs obligations within the WTO dispute settlement system. See J. H. Reichman,
Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component
of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L. LAW. 345 (1995); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement
Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 356 (1997).
22 This "bargain" narrative of the TRIPs Agreement is not universally accepted as
complete. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
23 See Joined Cases C-241/91 P & 242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n, 1995
E.C.R. 1-743; ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a
cause of action to enforce a contractual obligation prohibiting acts of copying permitted by the
Copyright Act was not preempted). The bodies of law external to intellectual property that
might become relevant to lawmakers continue to expand. For example, what is the balance to be
struck between intellectual property rights and potentially conflicting human rights such as free
speech? See Laurence Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2008).
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both easy digital reproduction and the application of technological
protection measures. 24 In short, balance is a more complex organism
than we might expect or might assume.25
II. PROCESS
Let me turn now to the process that led to the WIPO Copyright
Treaty. I will focus on three aspects of that process: the speed with
which the question of copyright protection in the digital arena (and, in
particular, protection against circumvention of TPMs) became a
matter of international regulation; the increased involvement of
NGOs in the international lawmaking process; and, the assimilation
of national and international lawmaking.
A. Speed
Normally, it takes an appreciable period of time for countries to
move from proposals (and, indeed, national laws) to a concluded
international treaty. The Diplomatic Conference took place during
December 1996. The so-called "digital agenda," which the
Conference was to address, was only considered as such by the WIPO
Committee of Experts in September 1995.26
24 Cf Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and
Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 5(2)(b), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (noting connection
between levy-style exceptions to copyright and application of TPMs). This dimension to balance
is raised both by copyright owners and user groups. Thus, some advocates of a strong public
domain have suggested that the loss of copyright occasioned by non-compliance with U.S.
copyright formalities should be figured into any assessment of the historical balance that
contemporary copyright should, it is argued, preserve. See Christopher J. Sprigman,
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485, 487 (2004); David S. Olson, First
Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1393, 1419
(forthcoming 2009), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1534968 (arguing that judges
interpreting copyright law post-Eldred are obligated to make greater accommodation of First
Amendment interests in light, inter alia, of the alleged contraction of the public domain that
comes from the elimination of formalities). Likewise, copyright owners often emphasize the
increased capacity for unauthorized reproduction in the digital environment to support calls for
greater legal rights.
25 Indeed, if one wanted to explore even more fully the different balances appropriate to
copyright lawmaking, the inquiry could be extended to encompass consideration of institutional
balance between legislative and judicial development of copyright law, to name but one
additional complication.
26 See FICSOR, supra note 13, at 33 n.105. The copyright proposals that WIPO had been
developing during the previous three or four years were less digitally oriented, albeit no less
controversial (for example, adoption of a copyright term of life plus 70 as an international
standard); cf. id. at 33-34 (noting that some digital issues, such as the protection of software or
databases, had been on the WIPO work programme for some time, but that they had not been
seen as part of any broader "digital agenda"). The order of work for international copyright
policymakers from 1995 on was quite different for the five or six years that preceded the onset
of the digital agenda.
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Moreover, classically, international copyright law had in large part
involved consolidation of laws that were already enacted at the
national level, at least by some of the contracting states. 27 But the
models for digital copyright law that countries were considering
during the WIPO Copyright Treaty deliberations were no more than
proposals at the national level. The U.S. White Paper on the National
Information Infrastructure was published only in the autumn of
1995.28 The parallel Japanese and EU proposals can be traced to the
same time frame.29
Thus, the WCT was not a consolidation of national laws; it was an
international consolidation of national proposals (within a year of
those proposals being first floated in detail). And the speed with
which the WCT was concluded was very different from that at which
the classical international copyright system moved. The WCT can be
seen as an attempt to create an international norm that would then be
used to structure then-nascent national models (particularly with
regard to prohibitions on circumvention of TPMs). ° Indeed, one of
the primary motivations for the United States to push international
action was the resistance being encountered domestically to proposals
pending in the Congress; those international obligations could then be
used to reframe the domestic debate.3'
If speed has changed the nature of the lawmaking process in ways
that affect the substantive content of copyright law, perhaps scholars
and policymakers need to develop constraints that prevent this
procedural change from having adverse substantive consequences? Of
course, to the extent that one is less than enamored of this lawmaking
process, one response is simply to emphasize the virtues of the
deliberate character of international lawmaking. That is, one might
simply reverse this change. But that may be too facile a response.
Interdependence of nations may have increased to such an extent that,
27 The core copyright treaty, the Berne Convention, certainly fitted within the category of
"consolidating treaties." However, WIPO had on rare occasions pursued "pioneering" treaties,
such as the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organisations, where the international convention moved beyond national models.
See FICSOR, supra note 13, at 4 (describing the Rome Convention in these terms).
28 See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(1995).
29 The Commission of the European Communities had published a Green Paper on
Copyright and Related Rights in mid-1995. But it was the Follow-Up to the Green Paper on
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society that was the basis for the positions
taken by the EC at the Diplomatic Conference. That document was published only just before
the Conference. See FICSOR, supra note 13, at 27-29.
30 See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Rules Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).
31 See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 429-30.
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on occasion, international lawmaking might be an avenue of more
ready resort in case domestic initiatives would prove futile. However,
if countries accelerate international lawmaking, they must do so fully
aware of the costs of a lack of national experimentation. The WCT (at
least, as nationally implemented) altered the substantive balance of
copyright protection on an international scale in very short order.32 If
pursued with greater deliberation, a quite different system might have
ensued, learning from the lessons of different national models.
Adopting the international norms in softer form, as has been done in
trademark law, might have preserved greater flexibility to review the
situation as experience at the national level accumulates.
Another response to the suggestion that the accelerated
international lawmaking process is skewing the substantive balance of
copyright law, as some have suggested,33 is to guarantee users' rights
as part of an international instrument. Increased discussion of this
lawmaking strategy may reflect doubt that national political processes
can secure balance on the ground, especially in the context of an
integrated national/international lawmaking dynamic. 34 Indeed, at the
WCT Diplomatic Conference, a variety of countries, including
Australia, South Africa and Tanzania, suggested that the Conference
consider adopting mandatory exceptions. Those proposals were not
pursued in 1996, but discussion of mandatory exceptions (or users'
rights or substantive maxima) 35 is likely only to intensify.36
In his contribution to this symposium, Professor David Vaver
suggested a further alternative device to ensure a substantive balance
in copyright law. Professor Vaver argued that international law might
impose a "reverse three-step test," which would permit the creation of
32 In fact, the WCT itself afforded substantial room for different countries to adopt
different approaches to the regulation of TPMs. See J.H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of
Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007). The balance
has been more dramatically altered by national implementation in the EU and the United States
that has been extended internationally through bilateral trade agreements. See id. This
phenomenon can only be addressed through other reforms. See infra text accompanying note 33.
33 But see supra note 32.
3 See Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the Internet Treaties, 77
FORDHAm L. REv. 2379, 2404-08 (2009) (discussing the institutional capacity of developing
countries to exercise effective design choices at the national level). The importance of viewing
the international copyright system in a holistic fashion, taking full account of the characteristics
of national regimes, is understood not only by advocates of users' rights. Thus, copyright
owners sought to bring questions of enforcement to the international table in part as a result of
dissatisfaction with reliance on national judicial and administrative systems. See 1 RICKETSON
& GINSBURG, supra note 1, at § 4.08.
35 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Design Protection in
the European Union, 24 AM. INTELL. PROP L. ASS'N Q. J. 611, 715 n.274 (1996); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round I: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004).
36 See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 17, at 220-21.
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any new rights under national law only if the nation in question could
show a demonstrated need for such rights.37 In some respects, if
embodied in a treaty, this device would resemble what might be
called a substantive maximum, a ceiling on protection. And certainly,
the device is already being deployed rhetorically.
B. Non-Governmental Organizations
A second difference in the process that led to the WCT was the
role of NGOs. At the Diplomatic Conference at which the WCT was
concluded, there were seventy-six NGOs acting as observers. In
contrast, twenty-six NGOs participated in the Stockholm revision of
the Berne Convention.38 This changed the lawmaking dynamic quite
substantially. Some of these changes were good; increased
participation ensured that a greater range of perspectives were aired at
the Conference. 39 But there were costs. At some point, when you have
several hundred people in the conference chamber, the deliberative
process becomes unwieldy, to put it mildly. n° It becomes difficult to
engage in the kinds of open negotiation and meetings that previously
typified WIPO proceedings, 41 and which would be the form of
transparent lawmaking that enhanced democratic accountability.42
Instead, during the last week of the WCT Diplomatic Conference-
when all the most contested substantive decisions were made-the
delegates frequently retreated into informal groups in order simply to
accommodate practical logistics. Thus, despite the physical proximity
of representatives from a greater range of organizations, many
37 See Vaver, supra note 12, at 736 ("If user rights were truly to be balanced against
owner rights, one would expect to find a provision that owner rights should be enacted or
enforced only in (1) certain special cases that (2) demonstrably encourage the production of the
work, and that (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of users. That feature of
balance does not yet appear on any WIPO or TRIPS agenda. It should.").
38 See JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEwiNSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: THE WIPO
COPYRIGHT TREATY AND THE WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY 9 (2002).
39 See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 432-33.
40 See FICSOR, supra note 13, at 46-47 (stressing the importance of informal
consultations); REINBOTHE & VON LEWINKSI, supra note 38, at 14-15 (discussing the nature of
the negotiations at the WCT occasioned by physical space constraints).
41 See REiNBOTHE & VON LEW1NKSI, supra note 38, at 14 (noting that negotiations in
formal, open meetings with all participants present was "a distinctive feature of negotiations
within WIPO . . . as opposed to negotiations in the former GATT (now WTO), where no
intergovemmental or non-governmental organisations are admitted as observers to the
negotiations").
42 This is not to say that proceedings at WIPO meetings were always conducted in plenary
session. Even with smaller NGO representation, some progress depended upon discussions
among smaller groupings of nations and upon side consultation with interested parties from
industry. See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2008).
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decisions were made without the direct input of all the diverse groups
actually present in the main conference chamber.43
This is not just a copyright issue. Recent discussions surrounding
reform of the process by which the Internet is governed suggest that
debates will be taking place more generally about how best to
structure inclusive international lawmaking in an era where national
interests are more directly implicated by that lawmaking.
44
C. The Assimilation of National and International Lawmaking
Finally, the WCT was an early example of the assimilation of
national and international copyright lawmaking processes, where the
substance of the debate in both contexts focused on the internal
substantive balance in copyright law. This may flow naturally from
the first two process-based changes I have mentioned. As
international norms become less dependent upon prior national
experimentation, and national interests are more directly represented
by NGOs on the international stage, the lines between the national
and international debate inevitably are blurred. And it might not be
wholly inappropriate, because increased national interdependence
means that the vindication of national policy objectives becomes
crucially influenced by international developments.
The trend toward this assimilation was facilitated by changes in
WIPO's (already liberal) policy toward accreditation of observers.
Formerly, only international NGOs would be accredited as observers
at WIPO meetings. Not long before the WCT, WTPO decided that
even purely national groups could be accredited (both those
representing intellectual property owner interests as well as those
representing users).45 These national organizations have long been
involved in domestic lawmaking, and are well versed in the forms of
debate and legislative compromise that surround the adoption of
43 See REINBOTHE & VON LEwINSKI, supra note 38, at 10 (noting that NGOs were
excluded from certain informal consultations). Of course, given the critique of the process by
which an institution becomes accredited as an observer at WIPO, see infra text accompanying
note 45, it is by no means obvious that direct involvement of every such group would be
warranted as a matter of democratic ideals. See Steve Charnovitz, Accountability of
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance (George Washington Univ.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 145, 2005), available at
http://preprodpapers.ssrn.comlsol3/cf-dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per-id=257095.
44 See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Malte Ziewitz, Jefferson Rebuffed: The United States
and the Future ofinternet Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH L. REV. 188 (2007) (discussing
the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunis in 2005).
45 The distinction between national and international NGOs has in any event been
challenged by the rise of transnational networks of activists. See MARGARET E. KECK &
KATHRYN SIKKINK, AcrivisTs BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLrrICs (1998) (discussing conditions that cause the emergence of such networks).
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national legislation. When they arrived in Geneva to discuss topics
also being considered domestically, the national NGOs naturally
advanced arguments similar to those that they would have made at
home. But the international process is different. Despite changes in
the lawmaking process and arguable convergence in global markets
and norms, the international instrument must cohere with a broader
range of legal traditions and permit contracting states to develop
diverse national solutions appropriate to their own local situation.
International policymakers seek to achieve a general conmmitment by
a large number of parties to basic standards, ideally through
consensus; immense, negotiated detail can impede each of these
objectives.
The WCT Diplomatic Conference also took place at a time of
shifting international political relations. In 1996, EU institutions were
becoming central to multilateral international copyright negotiations.
These institutions had just spent several years engaged in intensive
harmonization of European copyright law. The process by which
copyright harmonization directives had been concluded might have
been seen by some as a model for international lawmaking. But the
EU consists of relatively homogenous nations committed to a single
market, and was even more obviously of this complexion in 1996.
The EU is founded on an extensive institutional infrastructure, to
which member states have ceded sovereignty. None of this is true at
the multilateral level. It is dangerous to assume that what happens in
the EU lawmaking process should be replicated at the multinational
level. But this supposition might have informed the climate at the
time.46
Finally, the assimilation of the national and international processes
might also have reflected changes in WIPO itself. From 1971 through
1996, with the multilateral norm development process at an impasse,
WIPO had engaged in so-called "guided development," a process that
46 Cf. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 1, at § 4.41. International relations generally
were in flux at this time. These broader developments undoubtedly feed into the international
copyright dynamic. The leading international copyright treaty had existed without the United
States for one hundred and two years. See RICKETSON AND GINSBURG, supra note 1, at §§ 4.43-
4.46. But the United States had recently become the only global superpower. The deletion of the
audiovisual component of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, negotiated at the
same Diplomatic Conference, reflected the need to assuage America: despite the history of the
Berne and Rome Conventions, contracting states concluded that they could not possibly have an
audiovisual treaty without the involvement of the United States. See FICSOR, supra note 13, at §
2.48. Likewise, the most significant vindication of U.S. objectives with respect to TPMs came
not so much through the text of the WCT, but through influencing national implementation in
later bilateral trade negotiations. See id. at §§ 4.54-55. In that context, political power may be
more outcome-determinative.
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included advising member states on the content of national laws.47 As
part of that process, WIPO started developing a model law on
copyright. Such a law contains a level of detail quite different from
that which would be found in a treaty. But developing model laws
was a more dominant part of the WIPO agenda for the quarter century
preceding the WCT than had perhaps been the case earlier in the
organization's history. And that model law was used internally by
WIPO in preparing documents laying the groundwork for later
48international agreements.
For all these reasons, the WCT saw an assimilation of the national
and international debate. And this has only become more so in the
years since. Discussion now too often appears to operate on the
assumption that lawmaking in Geneva is the same as would occur in
Washington or Brussels, except in many more languages. But the
international lawmaking process differs from national lawmaking,
both in its role in defining applicable norms and in the democratic
accountability that informs its legitimacy. Moreover, when a norm is
adopted at the international level, it is entrenched with an almost
quasi-constitutional status and becomes very hard to revise.49 That is
very different from a domestic statute.
For all these reasons, although much was gained from the process
that was pursued in Geneva in 1996, I think we may have lost many
things that are valuable.
2010 POSTSCRIPT
In the four years since the symposium, many of the aspects of
international copyright lawmaking discussed above have indeed
become the norm. Thus, substantive balance remains a central
concern in international debates, with the supposition increasingly
being that the international instruments should ensure that result.
Occasionally, voices are raised questioning whether international
regulation of a particular issue is appropriate, although often this
stems from opposition to the particular substantive rule being
considered at the international level. The distinct values of national
autonomy or comparing different legal approaches to common
problems, as independent lawmaking objectives rather than useful
strategic arguments, do not seem to excite quite the same passions.5°
47 See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 1, at §§ 4.13-4.14.
48 See FICSOR, supra note 13, at 13.
49 See Dinwoodie, supra note 18.
50 But see Statement of the United States of America on Copyright Exceptions and
Limitations for Persons with Print Disabilities, World Intellectual Property Organisation
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Nineteenth Session, Dec. 14-18, 2009, at
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The pressure for the development of users' rights at the
international level, noted in my original remarks, has only
intensified.51  In part, as suggested above, this can be seen as an
antidote to the political power imbalance that might skew bilateral
trade agreements (and in turn national copyright laws) or to the lack
of national political infrastructure that renders the notion of preserved
flexibilities less than meaningful for some countries. But it might also
be an inevitable product of assimilating national and international
processes. And, of course, it might be an appropriate response to the
growing interdependence of nations. Regardless of the explanation,
debates about users' rights will continue to dominate the international
copyright conversation in the near future (at least at the truly
multilateral level). Recent discussions in the WIPO Standing
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights regarding exceptions
and limitations for persons with print disabilities appear to confirm
this prediction.
In contrast, the speed at which the WCT was concluded appears
unlikely to be a characteristic of the next round of global copyright
lawmaking. Since the WCT, international norm-setting at WIPO has
moved (if at all) extremely slowly. The possible explanations for this
substantive impasse are varied.52 But one byproduct has been further
forum-shifting by some developed countries to ensure faster progress
on certain enforcement issues than they thought likely under the aegis
of WIPO or the WTO. These (approximately forty) countries have
2 [hereinafter U.S. December 2009 WIPO SCCR Statement], available at www.uspto.gov/ip/
global/copyrights/wipo-sccr_19session.pdf (noting the importance of the "thorough
comparative work we must always do as a foundation for the development of new norms
in international copyright law" and extending that sentiment to consideration not only of
legal rules, but also of best practices in affected industries). The statement of the United
States to the SCCR at the Nineteenth Session of the SCCR in December 2009 is a pithy
encapsulation of many of the issues addressed in this essay. It suggests an openness to
different forms of international lawmaking (including mandatory exceptions) fully
cognizant of the distinct role of the international treaty instrument (along with other
institutions such as national laws and market practices) in establishing an appropriate
copyright landscape.
S See, e.g., P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RuT L. OKEDuI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND ExCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT
35-49 (2008), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/limitations-exceptions-copyright.pdf
(recommending a global instrument on limitations and exceptions in the international copyright
system); Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough: The Notion of Binding
Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual
Property, Competition and Tax Law Research Paper Series No. 09-01, Dec. 8, 2008), available
at www.ssm.conabstract= 1326429.
52 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties,
Norms, National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT 61, 84-92 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007).
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separately commenced- negotiation of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA). The precise scope of the draft ACTA is unclear
because the text has thus far been kept secret, but it would appear
(from leaks) to address enforcement issues beyond what might be
regarded as core problems of counterfeiting.
Does the ACTA represent the new form of international copyright
lawmaking? Certainly, the (relatively secret) process by which the
treaty is being developed resembles that by which many bilateral
trade agreements-an increasingly important component of the
international copyright policy of both the United States and the
European Union-have been pursued. However, at some point, in
order to make the treaty fully operational, the negotiating parties will
have to expose its terms to the scrutiny of their respective national
lawmaking processes (which may vary depending, among other
things, on the lawmaking power of the executive branch). The ability
to persuade national lawmakers of the merits of the proposals will
surely be enhanced if the legitimacy of the international process is
unimpeachable; open multilateral discussion, of the type seen at the
WCT, is more likely to provide that endorsement.
But given the reasons for the commencement of separate ACTA
negotiations in the first place, developed countries might view a
return to WlPO as futile. An intervention by the United States at a
recent meeting of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights suggests not. Thus, in a statement indicating
receptivity to exceptions and limitations for persons with print
disabilities under international copyright law, the United States noted
its commitment "to both better exceptions in copyright law and better
enforcement of copyright law. . . .This is part and parcel of a
balanced international system of intellectual property. 53 Balance is,
indeed, a complex notion-and maybe "linkage" is a further
component of balance that we need to (re-)consider.
53 See U.S. December 2009 WIPO Statement, supra note 50, at 5 (emphasis added).
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